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and Women’s Citizenship 
in Iowa, 1865–1879 
SHARON ROMEO 
IN COURT in July 1876 Nancy E. Haygood testified that her 
neighbor, A. F. Bell, had persuaded her to engage in sexual inter-
course. At the time of her seduction, Haygood was a 20-year-
old resident of Mills County, Iowa. The couple lived about a 
mile from each other and had become engaged earlier that year. 
According to Haygood, Bell had pursued her for sexual inter-
course over the course of several months before she eventually 
capitulated to his wishes. When Bell was tried for felonious se-
duction, Haygood told the court that she believed him when he 
promised that “he wouldn’t harm me and wanted me to have 
confidence in him.” The jury in the case ultimately convicted Bell 
and sentenced him to a “term” in the penitentiary.1  
 Seduction cases such as State v. Bell illustrate how criminal 
seduction laws promoted a concept of gendered citizenship—
the legal logic that demanded that men and women be allocated 
the rights and obligations of citizenship based on their sex.2 The 
Iowa Code of 1851 included a seduction statute that allowed the 
legal system to prosecute “if any person seduce and debauch 
any unmarried woman of previously chaste character.”3 Iowa’s 
                                                 
1. State v. Bell, 49 Iowa 440 (1878), “Appellant’s Abstract of Evidence,” 11.  
2. The rights and obligations of citizenship have historically been connected to 
gender identity in the United States. See Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional 
Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship (New York, 1998).  
3. Code of Iowa, 1851, ch. 138, § 2586, 262; Code of Iowa, 1873, ch. 2, § 3867, 3868; 
John E. Briggs, History of Social Legislation in Iowa (Iowa City, 1915), 52.  
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seduction statute provided special protection for the female 
gender from male libertines.  
 Iowa’s courts began to affirm felonious conviction for seduc-
tion during Reconstruction, which was a period of intense discus-
sion in the state about the political enfranchisement of African 
Americans and women. Ultimately, the legal logic of criminal 
seduction undermined the legitimacy of women’s claims to po-
litical enfranchisement. As Iowans debated the meanings of 
capacity and consent for female citizens, seduction convictions 
implied that it would be inappropriate to enfranchise women as 
political voters. The virtue and liberty of women were best pro-
tected within a marital relationship. Sex and politics mingled as 
legislators and lawyers discussed women’s right to consent in 
both governmental and marital relationships.  
 An analysis of Reconstruction-era seduction cases like State 
v. Bell demonstrates a historical trajectory in which the Iowa 
Supreme Court established who needed to be protected by the 
criminal seduction statute. The circumstances of seduction cases 
changed in the years after the Civil War, especially after 1870, a 
year the Iowa legislature voted on women’s enfranchisement. 
As the 1870s progressed, the courts identified adult women as 
vulnerable to criminal seduction. 
 This article examines State v. Bell (1878) and four additional 
appellate seduction cases: State v. Carron (1865), State v. Shean 
(1871), State v. Kingsley (1874), and State v. Haven (1876). Iowa’s 
Supreme Court affirmed convictions in the first two cases and 
reversed the latter two.4 The affirmation of felony seduction 
convictions began during the years of Reconstruction, but the 
later reversal decisions show more clearly how the court im-
posed legal obligations for adults based on gender difference 
through its definition of a seducible woman.  
 
The Legal Logic of Seduction 
State v. Bell presents circumstances typical of seduction cases 
affirmed by Iowa’s Supreme Court during the Reconstruction era. 
The victim was defined as an adult woman who had reached 
                                                 
4. State v. Carron, 18 Iowa 372 (1865); State v. Shean, 32 Iowa 88 (1871); State v. 
Kingsley, 39 Iowa 439 (1874); State v. Haven, 43 Iowa 181 (1876).  
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her majority at the time of her seduction. The couple had “kept 
company” for a substantial period of time, and A. F. Bell had 
proposed marriage to his victim. Nancy Haygood believed what 
she was told and claimed that she was “tricked” by Bell’s per-
suasion and seemingly kind character. Seduction was always a 
verbal act: a false promise, artifice, flattery, or deception.5 
 Seduction appeared in the first official code of Iowa as a 
criminal offense that could be punished by a maximum of five 
years or, for less aggravated instances, “by a fine not exceeding 
one thousand dollars and imprisonment in the county jail not 
exceeding one year.” Iowa’s code of laws also contained a sepa-
rate classification of offenses against chastity, morality, and de-
cency. Crimes in this area included adultery, bigamy, or lewd-
ness, when women and men “lewdly and viciously associate 
and cohabit together.” Unlike these crimes, speech was a neces-
sary component of a seduction conviction. The code punished 
men for the misleading speech claims that accompanied a de-
bauchery of a “chaste” woman.6 
 A. F. Bell’s seduction conviction hinged on whether he “in-
duced” Haywood’s capitulation through deceptive language. 
By 1878, the year Bell’s lawyers appealed his case, the Iowa Su-
preme Court had solidified its definition of seducible women. 
                                                 
5. State v. Bell, 49 Iowa 440 (1878), “Appellant’s Abstract of Record,” 4, “Appel-
lant’s Abstract of Evidence,” 11, 12, 14.  
6. Code of Iowa, 1851, ch. 138, § 2586; Code of Iowa, 1873, ch. 9, § 4008, 4011, 4012. 
A number of authors have written on various aspects of the history of seduc-
tion in the nineteenth-century United States. On the criminalization of seduction, 
see Lori D. Ginzberg, Women and the Work of Benevolence: Morality, Politics, and 
Class in the Nineteenth-Century United States (New Haven, CT, 1990), 77–79; 
Mary P. Ryan, Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825–1880 (Balti-
more, 1990), 100–102; and Mary Frances Berry, “Judging Morality: Sexual 
Behavior and Legal Consequences in the Late Nineteenth-Century South,” 
Journal of American History 78 (1991), 848–53. On the history of seduction as a 
tort, see Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good 
Nature ‘Deceit’: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction,” Columbia Law Review 93 
(1993), 374–472; and Lea VanderVelde “The Legal Ways of Seduction,” Stan-
ford Law Review 48 (1996), 817–900. On the nineteenth-century identification of 
seduction as one cause of prostitution, see Sharon Elizabeth Wood, The Freedom 
of the Streets: Work, Citizenship and Sexuality in a Gilded Age City (Chapel Hill, 
NC, 2005), 80. For background on the New York Female Moral Reform Society, 
see Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Disorderly Conduct: Visions of Gender in Victorian 
America (New York, 1985), 113–28. 
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When Bell appealed his conviction to the Iowa Supreme Court, 
Chief Justice Joseph Beck noted that a seducer must, through 
the use of “flattery, promises, or other arts or devices,” influence 
the will of the victim.7 Although the seduced woman ultimately 
capitulates, her consent resulted from the libertine’s deception 
or his powerful skills of persuasion. 
 In State v. Bell, Iowa’s Supreme Court affirmed the convic-
tion and jail time, agreeing that Haygood yielded to Bell only 
after he falsely promised to marry her and encouraged her con-
sent with “flatteries and protestations of love.”8 Haygood testi-
fied that she had consented because “he persuaded, and coaxed, 
and asked how I could refuse him when he asked so nice.” The 
crime of seduction could not have occurred unless she believed 
Bell’s statements; the victim’s reason and will were won over 
because she believed his false promises, lies, and expressions of 
affection. She was unable to see through his deceptive speech 
with the power of her reason; her will was too weak to resist his 
verbal entreaties. Bell corrupted Haygood through his more 
powerful will and speech. As his victim testified to a jury of 12 
men, “I believed everything he told me, and worshiped him.” 
Haygood further explained to the jury, “I was seated in his lap, 
leaning up against him, and when I consented I got up and 
straddled over his lap.”9 
 Bell’s seductive words convinced a “chaste” woman to sub-
mit to his appeals. Under Iowa law, his verbal acts obliged him 
to act as a protector of his emotional dependent. The profession 
of love was instrumental in establishing a man’s legal obligation 
to protect his future wife. In seduction cases, the love of a woman 
for her seducer was of “the highest materiality” because the dec-
laration of his sentiments indicated that she believed he would 
protect her.10 If a man lied to a woman about the quality of his 
affections, she would misunderstand his subsequent obligations 
to her. This principle remained in place for decades. For example, 
in the case of State v. Gardner (1923), the Iowa Supreme Court 
                                                 
7. State v. Bell, 442.  
8. State v. Bell, “Appellant’s Abstract of Record,” 4.  
9. State v. Bell, “Appellant’s Abstract of Evidence,” 11, 14, 12.  
10. State v. Burns (1903), 119 Iowa 668. 
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affirmed a conviction because the defendant “professed to love 
her and promised to marry her and protect her.”11  
 Historically, the obligation to protect household dependents 
has played a critical role in establishing legal power over indi-
viduals.12 If men refused to protect “chaste” women, they at-
tacked aspects of a power structure that, at least rhetorically, 
required men to claim that they protected their dependents. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, men used their claims of 
“protection” to justify male power. The seduction statute al-
lowed the state of Iowa to label acts of seduction as deviant be-
havior for white men.13 If these “seducers” failed to live up to 
their obligations of citizenship, then the legal system made a 
show of punishing them. 
 State v. Bell illustrates how Iowa’s seduction statute, drawn 
from republican political theory, was centrally concerned with the 
free consent of an individual when entering into a relationship.14 
                                                 
11. State v. Gardner (1923), 195 Iowa 444. 
12. Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, “Contract versus Charity: Why Is There 
No Social Citizenship in the United States?” Socialist Review (1992), 56; Kerber, 
No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies. 
13. In the nineteenth century, industrialization and urbanization promoted the 
belief that male power derived from the status of “breadwinner.” As more 
families moved from farms to towns and cities, the concept of separate gen-
dered “spheres” allocated the duty of economic and political activities to men. 
Linda Kerber demonstrated the immense historical importance of this separate 
spheres ideology in her groundbreaking article, “Separate Spheres, Female 
Worlds, Woman’s Place: The Rhetoric of Women’s History,” Journal of American 
History 75 (1988), 9–39. For work on northeastern industrialization, the hidden 
value of unpaid housework, and the “cult” of the male breadwinner in the nine-
teenth-century United States, see Jeanne Boydston, Home and Work: Housework, 
Wages, and the Ideology of Labor in the Early Republic (New York, 1990). Boydston 
quantified the hidden value of women’s unpaid work that was obscured by 
the “separate spheres” ideology. On the meaning of white male protection and 
its role in upholding the power structure of the antebellum South, see Bertram 
Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South (New York, 
1982), 51; Victoria E. Bynum, Unruly Women: The Politics of Social and Sexual Control 
in the Old South (Chapel Hill, NC, 1992), 6–8; and Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The 
Mind that Burns in Each Body” in Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality, ed. 
Ann Snitowk, Christine Stansell, and Sharon Thompson (New York, 1983), 
334–37.  
14. Scholars have addressed the gendered aspects of republican political theory. 
See, for example, Jan Lewis, “The Republican Wife: Virtue and Seduction in the 
Early Republic,” William and Mary Quarterly 44 (1987), 689–721. On how the 
gendered nature of contract theory lies at the basis of republican political theory, 
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Deceptive speech on the part of a political representative corrupts 
the liberty of citizens in a republic. One of Nancy Haygood’s 
most important political choices in her life would be her consent 
to a proposal of marriage. A husband, in the nineteenth-century 
United States, was the proper political representative of his wife 
and dependents. In fact, he derived his status as political repre-
sentative through the dependence of his household on his rela-
tionship to the state. When A. F. Bell spoke falsely to Haygood, 
an unmarried woman, he exerted illegitimate authority over her 
person. Haygood could not “voluntarily” consent to a sexual 
relationship with Bell outside of the promise of marriage be-
cause she lacked the capacity to understand his true motives.  
  The seducer’s oratory undermined the unmarried woman’s 
mastery of her reason, her will, and her body. Iowa’s Supreme 
Court interpreted seductive speech as a sexual attack, and it 
was the seducer’s voice, not his body, that presented the greater 
threat to a woman’s virtue. Speech itself was wielded by the 
seducer as a sexual assault, both on a woman’s body and on her 
virtuous mind. Iowa’s seduction statute provided special pro-
tection for the female gender from male libertines.  
 The underlying logic of seduction narratives accepts fun-
damental sexual differences between men and women. Only a 
woman could be a victim of this crime; a female defendant was 
not possible within the language of the statute.15 The Iowa Su-
preme Court established the crime of seduction as more than 
                                                                                                       
see Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, CA, 1988). On the relation-
ship of gender to slavery in the antebellum South’s political ideology, see 
Stephanie McCurry, “The Two Faces of Republicanism: Gender and Proslavery 
Politics in Antebellum South Carolina,” Journal of American History 78 (1992), 
1245–64. For a discussion of the Edmund-Tucker Act, which disfranchised the 
women of Utah, see Sarah Barringer Gordon, “ ‘The Liberty of Self-Degradation’: 
Polygamy, Woman Suffrage, and Consent in Nineteenth-Century America,” 
Journal of American History 83 (1996). 
15. The Iowa Supreme Court could have affirmed convictions for extramarital 
sexual intercourse or equated chastity with virginity, but the court did not do 
so in the years leading up to Reconstruction. Of 16 criminal seduction cases 
appealed from 1865 to 1879, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed 10 convictions. 
Seven of those cases were affirmed after 1876, showing that at that time the 
court had defined the points of law clearly so that the instructions given by 
district court more closely matched the Supreme Court’s legal interpretation of 
the seduction statute.  
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the act of sexual intercourse, and chastity as “actual personal 
virtue in the female.”16 
 The seduction statute assumed that essential sexual differ-
ences necessitated legal rules for each gender. It divided all 
women into one of three categories: seducible, married, or lewd. 
Iowa’s Supreme Court reinforced legal marriage as the appro-
priate site for women’s political representation in the years fol-
lowing the Civil War. The court affirmed seduction convictions 
when the woman could be constructed as easily influenced and 
thus not fully capable of free consent. The judicial system pro-
moted essentialist stereotypes about women through its prose-
cution and conviction of “seducers.” By 1876, seduction cases 
had firmly established the incapacity of any “chaste” woman to 
enter an extralegal sexual relationship.17  
  
Suffrage Debates in Reconstruction-Era Iowa 
Iowa’s Supreme Court opinions defined the boundaries of crim-
inal seduction within a political context of disagreement about 
the inclusion of African Americans and women in Iowa’s fran-
chise. Iowa was a state dominated by the Republican Party, a 
state labeled the “radical star” for its early enfranchisement of 
African American male voters, but in the years after the Civil 
War it also proposed, debated, and, ultimately failed to give 
adult women, black and white, the vote. In 1870 the Iowa leg-
islature initially approved changes to Iowa’s constitution that 
would have allowed women to vote, but approval was required 
a second time before the changes could be submitted to a popu-
lar vote for ratification. In 1872 the Iowa state senate failed to 
pass the suggested alterations. The state would have to wait for 
a future generation of suffragists, including Iowan Carrie Chap-
man Catt, to mobilize the political support necessary for wom-
en’s enfranchisement.18 
                                                 
16. State v. Andre, 5 Iowa 389 (1857), 390.  
17. Four criminal convictions of seduction were appealed to Iowa’s Supreme 
Court before 1865. The court reversed all of those decisions, primarily because 
the court was in the process of defining the limits and definitions of the crimi-
nal seduction statute.  
18. Louise R. Noun, Strong-Minded Women: The Emergence of the Woman-Suffrage 
Movement in Iowa (Ames, 1969), 128–33; Robert Cook, Baptism of Fire: The Re-
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   Ultimately, seduction cases such as State v. Bell affirmed a 
gendered concept of citizenship. While the 1870 and 1872 legis-
latures debated removing the word male from voting qualifica-
tions in Iowa’s state constitution, criminal seduction convictions 
reinforced the conceptions of essential gender differences in the 
ability to reason and think. The court’s sexual ideology helped 
justify the political exclusion of women from enfranchisement. 
The criminal system solidified gender stereotypes and, conse-
quently, the sexes received unequal treatment under the law. 
Iowa presents us with a case study of how the legislature and 
the judicial system defined different legal and political obliga-
tions for the sexes during Reconstruction.  
 Reconstruction-era suffrage activists not only fought to en-
franchise women, but they also employed universal rights ar-
guments to combat the assertion that women should not vote 
because of their intellectual capacity. They employed equal 
rights ideologies against men like H. R. Claussen, a senator who 
opposed woman suffrage. In 1872 Claussen gave a speech to the 
senate claiming that women’s enfranchisement was “against 
public welfare.” He based his claim on his belief that the female 
mind “is not original, not productive of great original ideas, but 
merely receptive.” He warned that Iowa should not give “a 
voice to women, whose name is frailty.”19  
 In 1872 women lobbied state legislators to vote for the pro-
posed enfranchisement amendment. In a letter to a newspaper, 
“Ruth” claimed that a Republican member of the state legisla-
ture had told her that he believed that there was “too much ig-
norant voting already, and that he was in favor of limiting male 
suffrage on the basis of intelligence.” Ruth vigorously refuted 
his logic. Republicans themselves had labeled the right to vote 
an inalienable right; “It is too late now to throw this dust in our 
                                                                                                       
publican Party in Iowa, 1838–1878 (Ames, 1994), 183; Robert R. Dykstra, Bright 
Radical Star: Black Freedom and White Supremacy on the Hawkeye Frontier (Cam-
bridge, MA, 1993), 224–27. For a discussion of the different philosophies of 
Democrats and Republicans regarding state power and regulation of domestic 
life, see Rebecca Edwards, Angels in the Machinery: Gender in American Party 
Politics from the Civil War to the Progressive Era (New York, 1997), 12–35.   
19. H. R. Claussen, “Woman Suffrage,” Daily Iowa State Register, 3/30/1872; 
Daily Iowa State Register, 3/30/1873. For historical background on Claussen, 
see Wood, The Freedom of the Streets, 3. 
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eyes and say ‘all women shall not vote because a portion of 
them may be as ignorant as some men.’”20 
 In 1871 and 1872, Iowa antisuffragists wrote letters to news-
papers accusing Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony 
of destroying the marriage bond and correlating women’s polit-
ical enfranchisement with the destruction of marriage. In a letter 
in the Daily Iowa State Register, headed “Suffrage, and How the 
Women of Iowa Will Vote in 1872,” “R. W. T” accused suffra-
gists of working to destroy marriage and criticized Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton’s speech “Marriage and Maternity” as obscene, 
containing words only used by prostitutes. The writer went on 
to accuse woman suffrage advocates of corrupting the “young 
and innocent, the wise and virtuous.”21      
 Woman suffrage, to “R. W. T.,” was potentially more destruc-
tive to the republic than the secession of Southern states prior to 
the Civil War. “R. W. T.” urged Iowans to send antisuffrage peti-
tions to the state legislature to defeat woman suffrage and pre-
serve “inviolate the Republic” that men had so recently died to 
preserve. Women’s enfranchisement would cause “our dear little 
daughters” to become the prey of the “licentious libertine,” be-
cause divorce would become easy to obtain. In fact, “R. W. T.” 
believed that women’s “inalienable rights” were violated by di-
vorce, not by their inability to vote or serve in political office.22  
 Iowa Attorney General Henry O’Connor distanced himself 
from the suffrage movement as he argued before the Iowa Su-
preme Court that it should uphold seduction convictions. In 
1871, amid increased concern that women’s enfranchisement 
would cause sexual immorality, O’Connor resigned as president 
of the Iowa Woman Suffrage Association.23 In June of the same 
year O’Connor argued against the appeal of Andrew Shean, 
whom he accused of being a “heartless coward” who took ad-
                                                 
20. “Ruth,” “A Few Thoughts on the Suffrage Question, by a Woman Who 
Wants to Vote,” Daily Iowa State Register, 3/27/1872.  
21. “R. W. T.,” “Suffrage, and How the Women of Iowa Will Vote in 1872,” 
Daily Iowa State Register, 8/10/1871. See also “R. W. T.,” “For Woman Suffrage 
—No,” Daily Iowa State Register, 10/26/1871. 
22. “R. W. T.,” “Suffrage.” 
23. Noun, Strong-Minded Women, 140–41, 182–85. 
44      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
vantage of Catherine Cavenaugh, a “poor girl” who gave Shean 
“her heart and her ‘honorable’ love.”24   
 
The Legal Narrative of Seduction in Reconstruction-Era Iowa 
In 1865, the final year of the Civil War, the Iowa Supreme Court 
affirmed the conviction in its first criminal seduction case, State 
v. Carron.25 The circumstances of the case were unusual for Re-
construction-era seduction cases, due to the young age of the 
victim. In Carron, the defendant sexually assaulted an 8-year-
old girl and then reinitiated the relationship when she was 13 
years old. The crime began when the defendant, a schoolteacher, 
boarded with the child’s family from July 1857 until 1862. Dur-
ing that time he proceeded to engage in “unlawful commerce” 
with the child.26 After serving in the Union navy during the 
Civil War, he returned and reinitiated his sexual relationship 
with the girl, who by then was 13 years old, promised her mar-
riage, and impregnated her.  
 The defense claimed that the girl was unchaste, as she had 
already been “debauched” by the defendant before he left for 
the navy. Ruling against him, the court, defining chastity as “ac-
tual personal virtue,” declared that the girl “was chaste as to all 
the world except the defendant.” The court found the victim to 
have been seduced because she was under the “influence and 
control he had unduly acquired over her.”27  
 Quite literally, the court accepted that the victim of seduction 
became corrupted as a result of the crime. The seducer drew his 
victim “aside from the paths of virtue, which she was honestly 
pursuing at the time the defendant approached her.”28 In the 
previous decade, the Iowa Supreme Court had defined chastity 
as a matter of physical virginity and the possession of a chaste 
“mind and sentiments.”29 To be led from the path of chastity 
                                                 
24. State v. Shean, 32 Iowa 88, “Brief for Appellee,” 4.  
25. State v. Carron, 18 Iowa 372 (1865). 
26. Ibid., 373.  
27. Ibid., 375, 374. 
28. Ibid., 376.  
29. In State v. Andre, 395, 399, the court determined it erroneous to instruct the 
jury that “unchaste character means actual sexual intercourse” and that the 
statute was for the protection of the “pure in mind, for the innocent in heart.”  
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meant that the seducer corrupted the virtuous character of his 
victim.    
 The court defended its affirmation by noting that the girl was 
so young that she was “incapable of consenting to a marriage, 
and incapable of that unchaste mind and heart which would 
defeat the action.”30 Typical of seduction cases, the Supreme 
Court’s opinion noted the influence that the man exerted in 
achieving his seduction; the seducer placed her “under his con-
trol.”31 The former schoolteacher was sentenced to five years 
imprisonment at the state penitentiary.  
 Over the years of Reconstruction, the major change in Iowa 
seduction convictions affirmed by the state Supreme Court was 
the age of the victims. In State v. Shean (1871), the next case af-
firmed after Carron (1865), the victim was 21 years old. In most of 
the seduction convictions affirmed by the court during the 1870s, 
the women had reached the age of majority. Iowa law consid-
ered these women as fully capable of marrying without their 
parents’ permission.32 The Supreme Court determined that the 
legal logic of seduction—that a woman’s reason could be ma-
nipulated through the strength of a seducer’s mind—could ap-
ply just as easily to an adult woman as it did to the control and 
influence that a schoolteacher held over a child of 8 or 13.  
 The curious case of State v. Shean reveals how, in 1871, the 
court held that strength of reason was weaker for women than 
for men. The crime commenced when Andrew Shean proposed 
marriage to Catherine Cavenaugh. Shean, a farmer, lived about 
a mile from Cavenaugh’s home, and the couple had “kept com-
pany” with each other for two years before the alleged seduction 
occurred. Cavenaugh would later testify that, on December 1, 
1868, she “permitted him to have intercourse with me, because I 
                                                 
30. State v. Carron, 377.  
31. Ibid., 375, 374.  
32. The prosecuting witness was above 18 years old in State v. Shean, 32 Iowa 
88 (1871); State v. Savoye, 48 Iowa 562 (1878); State v. Wells, 48 Iowa 671 (1878); 
State v. Bell; State v. Curran, 51 Iowa 112 (1879); and State v. Deitrick, 51 Iowa 467 
(1879). Aside from State v. Carron, two other cases were affirmed between the 
years 1865 and 1879 in which the prosecuting witness’s age was lower than 18; 
in State v. Higdon, 32 Iowa 262 (1871), her age was 13; in State v. Bowmann, 43 
Iowa 481 (1877), the prosecuting witness was 17 years old. 
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expected him to marry me.” After her child was born, Shean 
gave the child his last name, visited the child, and told Caven-
augh he would marry her. A jury in Clinton County convicted 
Andrew Shean of seduction, and he appealed to the Iowa Su-
preme Court.33 
 In Shean, the court defined all chaste women as a class of 
citizens who could be seduced from “a path of virtue.” While 
the Supreme Court understood the victim of Carron to be legally 
too young to consent to marriage, even with her parents’ per-
mission, Catherine Cavenaugh, the victim in State v. Shean, was 
a 21-year-old woman. Carron used the statute of seduction to 
protect a 13-year-old girl and punish the man who violated her 
when she was 8 years old. Shean extended the same rationale to 
the protection of a 21-year-old woman and defined the offenses 
as identical.  
 Criminal enforcement of seduction justified the political ex-
clusion of women as a class from enfranchisement. A seducer 
demonstrates that an independent woman’s virtue is easily cor-
rupted because she is not protected by the influence of a hus-
band, and her weak powers of reason and intellect prevent her 
escape.34 Iowa’s seduction statute, especially when applied to 
adult women, reinforced the assumption that women needed to 
be protected, not only from libertines but also from their own 
insufficient brainpower. 
 Andrew Shean violated the responsibilities of independent 
men who gain their legitimacy by protecting their household 
dependents. Shean was able to corrupt Cavenaugh, a previously 
“virtuous girl,” because he promised a relationship he did not 
fulfill.35 He damaged her ability to contract a legal marital rela-
tionship that would enable her to gain political representation 
of her interests to the state. The criminal statute of seduction en-
forced a conservative message bolstering the rights of husbands 
to represent their wives and political leaders to represent their 
male constituents. A seducer symbolized the tyranny that could 
                                                 
33. State v. Shean, 32 Iowa 88 (1871); State v. Shean, “Abstract of the Pleadings 
and Evidence,” 3.  
34. Elizabeth Barnes, States of Sympathy: Seduction and Democracy in the Ameri-
can Novel (New York, 1997), 8.  
35. Ibid., 90.  
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result from the breakdown of patriarchal institutions such as 
marriage.  
 In 1871, the year before Iowa’s legislature would vote down 
the proposed suffrage amendment, a judge in Clinton County 
instructed the jury in 21-year-old Catherine Cavenaugh’s seduc-
tion trial that “our statute is for the protection of the poor in 
mind, for the innocent in heart, who may have been led 
astray.”36 This discourse on women’s capacity for intelligence 
occurred simultaneously in Iowa’s newspapers and the state leg-
islature in the early 1870s. Annie Savery, a women’s rights ac-
tivist, directly attacked the assertion that women were unsuitable 
voters because they were mentally inferior to men. In her 
speech to the Iowa Woman Suffrage Association at its 1871 con-
vention in Des Moines, Savery declared, “Either you must grant 
that women are capable of self-government, or that morally and 
mentally they are inferior to all men and need guardians and 
legal restriction to keep them within the pale of civilization.”37 
As Iowans debated what political and legal rights were owed 
to women, the Iowa Supreme Court began to affirm seduction 
convictions for adult women. Catherine Cavenaugh was 21 dur-
ing the trial of Andrew Shean—the same age that male Iowans 
reached their majority and, of course, could cast a ballot. 
 
Overturning Seduction 
When the Iowa Supreme Court overturned seduction convictions 
in the 1870s, the justices provided instructive examples of how 
they interpreted an independent or “strong-minded” woman. 
Legal rhetoric correlated the strong-minded woman with licen-
tiousness and vice—not an appealing candidate for enfranchise-
ment. In 1876 a particularly revealing case, State v. Haven, 
reached the Iowa Supreme Court, which reversed the lower 
court’s decision because the victim told the man that she did not 
intend to marry and thus, according to the court’s reasoning, it 
would be impossible for her to be seduced. Chief Justice William 
Seevers, in his decision, found that the defendant had not used 
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any arts, false promises, or seductive influences that caused her 
to succumb to a sexual relationship.38   
 Norman Haven was a bachelor who lived with his parents 
while 22-year-old Sarah Johnson boarded with his family to at-
tend school. Johnson, the prosecutrix in this case, had remarked 
to several people that she never intended to marry, having pre-
viously rejected a proposal from a widower. While riding home 
from a church meeting, Haven wanted Johnson to promise to 
marry him if she ever decided to marry any man. A couple of 
times she turned him away when he tried to visit her room at 
midnight. She testified that, approximately two years after she 
had started boarding with the Havens, Norman came to her 
room and climbed in bed with her. “He said for me to keep still, 
or I would be hurt.” She told him he would ruin her, but he re-
plied that she should “know him well enough” to trust him. 
The next morning Haven told Johnson that he would not for-
sake her. She bore a child in April 1872.39 
 Although Johnson testified that Haven “had such an influ-
ence over me that I could not help believe what he told me,” 
Chief Justice Seevers did not consider Haven’s words to be evi-
dence of seduction. He pointed to her testimony in the cross-
examination that “he did not promise to marry me. . . . I told 
him at first I didn’t intend to marry anybody; afterwards I told 
him I never should marry any one but him since this happened, 
but not before.”40  
 Johnson was 22 years old when the seduction occurred. 
Haven’s lawyers pointed out Johnson’s age during her cross-
examination and queried her about living away from her mother 
for two years to attend school. The fact that Johnson was inter-
ested in education, along with her assertions to several people 
that she never wanted to marry, probably persuaded Justice 
Seevers that she was not a “seducible” woman. In fact, Haven’s 
lawyer argued that Johnson “was and is very far from being a 
person of weak mind, that on the contrary she has more than 
ordinary strength of mind.”41  
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 Haven’s defense lawyer correlated strength of mind with 
lewd and lascivious behavior. He accused Johnson of trying to 
“catch a bachelor” and claimed that Haven should not be pun-
ished for being seduced by a “designing and strong minded 
woman.” The lawyer even quoted poetry to refute Haven’s cul-
pability for the illicit sexual relationship: 
 If the bold brigand my bright eyes should see, 
 I am the victor,—the captive is he!42 
 Because the legal logic of seduction associated “strong-
minded” women with lewd and lascivious behavior, such inde-
pendent women threatened the gendered ideology of the mari-
tal social contract. State v. Haven demonstrated that an educated, 
independent-minded woman fell outside of the court’s protection. 
The prosecutorial powers of the state did not provide a legal 
remedy for women who did not fit the definition of a “seducible” 
woman.  
 The high court worked to separate the crime of seduction 
from rape by overturning misapplied seduction convictions. 
State v. Kingsley (1874) illustrates how the higher court viewed 
these problems. Eliza H. Brown, a 22-year-old resident of Dela-
ware County, had found work at Allen Kingsley’s cheese factory. 
After she had worked at the factory for two weeks, Kingsley 
approached her, claimed to love her, and attempted to kiss her. 
He also told her that no harm would come to her as a result of 
sexual intercourse, and if she got into “trouble he would see 
[her] out of it.” That was the first time Kingsley had approached 
Brown physically or claimed that he felt affection for her. She 
pushed him away and told him that she did not “want any such 
actions.”43 In response, Kingsley threatened that if she did not 
submit he would fire her and hire someone to replace her. 
Brown testified that, after about half an hour, Kingsley “threw 
me down on the floor and accomplished his desire.” After rap-
ing her, he threatened to fire her unless she continued to have 
sexual relations with him. Brown stated that, although she did 
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not give her consent to future intercourse, she did not resist 
“through fear of being thrown out of work.”44 
 Brown bore a child in March 1871, and in April Delaware 
County indicted Allen Kingsley for the crime of seduction. The 
district court determined that Kingsley’s threats to discharge 
Brown from the cheese factory induced her to “yield to his 
wishes” and “use less resistance than she otherwise would have 
done.”45 However, the Iowa Supreme Court overturned the 
verdict because Brown said the first act of “debauchery” was 
against her will and her consent. She did not believe that Kings-
ley loved her or that he would take care of her if she became 
pregnant.46  
 State v. Kingsley reveals how the Iowa Supreme Court con-
structed seduction as a crime committed against weak-minded 
women. But Eliza Brown knew her own mind. She was not a 
seducible victim, nor was she susceptible to Allen Kingsley’s 
deceiving promises. The justices did not believe that Kingsley’s 
threats “influenced” his victim’s will. The court did not see the 
incident as seduction because Kingsley’s statements did not con-
vince Brown—initially, she was simply overcome by physical 
force. Justice James Day, who wrote the opinion for the court, 
stated that this could not be seduction because Brown “persists in 
declaring that defendant accomplished his purpose by force and 
against her will.”47 Furthermore, they viewed her subsequent 
response to his threats as voluntary consent to sexual intercourse.  
 In Brown’s cross-examination, her testimony is clear: she 
saw through Allen Kingsley’s lies, and she did not succumb to 
him out of any weakness in her mind. When Kingsley’s lawyer 
cross-examined her, Brown remained firm about her opinions 
of Kingsley and his actions towards her.  
 Kingsley’s lawyer: “Did you believe he loved you?” 
 Brown: “No Sir.” 
 Kingsley’s lawyer: “Did you believe there was no risk to run?” 
 Brown: “No Sir.” 
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 Kingsley’s lawyer: “Did you believe his assurance that there was 
no hurt in it?” 
 Brown: “No sir. I believed there would be hurt in it; did not be-
lieve his assurance to the contrary.” 
 Kingsley’s lawyer: “You stated in your direct examination that he 
threw you on the floor?” 
 Brown: “Yes sir, he did.” 
 Kingsley’s lawyer: “Could you not have prevented that had you 
tried right hard?” 
 Brown: “No sir.” 
 Kingsley’s lawyer: “Did you consent to the intercourse?” 
 Brown: “No sir. The intercourse was against my consent and against 
my will.”48  
 Justice Day stated that if the above testimony was true, then 
Kingsley had raped Brown, but he also believed that the evi-
dence demonstrated that she had submitted to Kingsley “volun-
tarily and without the employment of artifice, promises, or per-
suasion.” The court implicitly defined the woman who cannot 
be seduced, who does not believe the reasoning of her seducer, 
as a woman who is unchaste, lewd, and, therefore, deviant. For 
a crime to be committed, the woman must be raped or seduced; 
threats to terminate employment combined with a first instance 
of nonconsensual sex did not fit the justices’ conception of the 
crime of seduction. As Justice Day wrote in his opinion, “The de-
fendant either committed the crime of seduction, or he did not.” 
The Iowa Supreme Court overturned Kingsley’s guilty convic-
tions because of Brown’s state of mind as seen in the above 
testimony.49 
 The true victim of seduction, in Justice Day’s mind, must 
consent for seduction to occur, but such consent would not be 
voluntary because she had been deceived, fooled, or influenced 
by a stronger mind. The court did not construct Eliza Brown as 
a victim of seduction because her employer had used undue 
influence to get sex through the use of threats. Additionally, 
Brown understood his words to be threats, not false promises. 
Her mind was not deceived. A true seduction victim was not 
capable of understanding that her seducer was lying to her. The 
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seducer possessed superior oratory skills, and he convinced his 
victims through speech. Justice Day dismissed the fact that 
Brown was threatened with the loss of her job; he rejected the 
economic consequences of dismissal as a form of seductive 
“persuasion.” According to Day, in spite of Brown’s previous 
state of virginity, she was not “led from the path of virtue by 
seductive arts.”50  
 Iowa’s legal code classified seduction, like rape, as an offence 
against an individual. The Supreme Court stated in 1870 that the 
victim of seduction, like a victim of rape, could be questioned 
about her previous sexual history.51 For both seduction and 
rape, the defendant could not be convicted on the testimony of 
the person injured without corroborating evidence; her testimony 
about the crime was not sufficient to sustain a guilty conviction.52 
Although rape, like seduction, was classified as a crime against 
an individual, a rape victim did not lose her virtuous character 
in the eyes of the law. The rape victim understood the corrupt 
nature of her attacker, but a victim of seduction mistakenly 
trusted a sexual predator. It is not surprising that lower courts 
confused the crimes of rape and seduction, as they dealt with 
similar issues of consent and force. In State v. Tarr, the court 
ruled that a jury could convict a defendant on a rape charge 
even if the victim did not resist if the jury determined that “she 
was idiotic or of imbecile mind.”53  
 The Iowa Supreme Court, during Reconstruction, established 
that physical force could not play a role in a seduction conviction; 
the court’s interpretation of seduction was unclear before lower 
court cases reached the state Supreme Court in the 1870s. Eliza 
Brown, according to the court, was neither seduced nor raped. 
Iowa’s statutory age for rape remained at 10 years old for girls 
until 1886, when the legislature raised the age to 13 in response 
to a Woman’s Christian Temperance Union national campaign 
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to raise the age of consent.54 Iowa’s Code of 1878 defined males 
as attaining their majority at the age of 21, and women at 18 
years unless they married earlier with parental consent. Just as 
a man could be convicted of raping a woman over the age of 
18, he could be convicted of seduction even if that woman had 
reached her majority.55 For girls or women above the age of 
consent, rape was defined as carnal knowledge “by force and 
against her will.”56 
 Iowa’s courts could not provide a legal remedy for Eliza 
Brown because the prosecutorial powers of the state benefited a 
particular type of woman—the woman who consented under the 
influence of a male’s intellectual strength. Eliza Brown’s circum-
stances lay outside the scope of Iowa’s seduction statute as de-
fined by the Supreme Court justices. State v. Haven and State v. 
Kingsley demonstrate that educated, independent-minded women 
fell outside the court’s protection. The court reserved the seduc-
tion statute for victims like Nancy Haygood of the 1878 Bell case. 
 
Conclusion 
Republican political theory suggested that women freely con-
sented to political representation by their husbands when they 
entered a “true” marriage—a marriage with a man who would 
uphold his marriage vows and represent the interests of his 
household to the state.57 Iowa citizens who opposed woman 
suffrage argued that women did not require the vote because 
faithful husbands would represent the interests of their wives. 
Those citizens viewed suffrage as a threat to the sexual morality 
of Iowa residents.58 Iowa legislators used this family preservation 
                                                 
54. Code of Iowa, 1873, ch. 2, § 3861. On Frances Willard and the Woman’s Chris-
tian Temperance Union’s campaigns to raise the age of consent, see Jane E. 
Larson, “ ‘Even a Worm Will Turn at Last:’ Rape Reform in Late Nineteenth-
Century America,” Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 9 (1997), 1–71; and 
Linda R. Hirshman and Jane E. Larson, Hard Bargains: The Politics of Sex (New 
York, 1998), 126–37. For discussion of the age-of-consent law in late nineteenth-
century Iowa and its prosecution, see Sharon E. Wood, The Freedom of the Streets, 
4, 134–36, 149–50. 
55. Code of Iowa, 1873, ch. 1, § 2186, 2521; ch. 4, § 2237.  
56. Code of Iowa, 1873, ch. 2, § 3861; Briggs, History of Social Legislation, 52.  
57. Pateman, The Sexual Contract. 
58. “R. W. T.,” “For Woman Suffrage—No!” 
54      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
rhetoric to justify their rejection of the proposed female suffrage 
amendments in 1872. During the debates over the amendments, 
Senator Benjamin Richards of Dubuque warned that the proposal 
must be defeated “for the sake of the family” and that the addi-
tion of woman suffrage would disgrace the state of Iowa.59  
 After Iowa’s legislature voted down the proposed enfran-
chisement of women, an appalled Annie Savery wrote a letter to 
the Daily Iowa State Register, responding to Richards. She asked 
how liberty could possibly promote immorality in white women’s 
character: “Why, sir, in the case of the black woman subject to 
her master, we said that slavery was the cause of her social sin. 
But in the case of the white woman, you declare that freedom is 
dangerous to her morality! Is this the secret of your opposition? 
Are the women of Iowa so corrupt, so inherently immoral that 
they cannot be trusted with the ballot?”60 
 Savery pointed out the sexual inequality embedded within 
the logic of criminal seduction: the seducible women of Iowa 
could not be trusted with the ballot. If a deceiving would-be lover 
could seduce a woman, politicians making false promises might 
just as easily win her over. 
 Women’s rights rhetoric shifted after the defeat of equal rights 
arguments. Equal rights rhetoric had failed to enfranchise women 
after the Civil War.61 After the close of Reconstruction, the 
Woman’s Christian Temperance Union chose to employ a politics 
of respectability that promoted the image of women as wives 
and mothers.62  
 The prosecution of sex crimes, such as seduction, would 
play a critical role in the conservative retrenchment during the 
latter years of Reconstruction and the Gilded Age. As the Recon-
struction era drew to a close, Iowa’s Supreme Court affirmed 
that women and men would not be treated equally under the law. 
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The prosecution of seduction demonstrates how Iowa courts 
promoted concepts of sexual difference that justified women’s 
political exclusion from the franchise. A gendered concept of 
citizenship rights and obligations justified the unequal treatment 
of women and their exclusion from full political participation in 
the state.  
